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Article 344 TFEU forbids Member States to pursue any other means of dispute settlement,
when issues regarding the application and interpretation of the Treaties are concerned.The Court
of Justice extended this principle to include disputes arising under international agreements,
where the subject matter falls under European Union (EU) competence. At the same time, the
number of international agreements to which direct effect is not granted is slowly rising.
Consequently, the question arises whether Member States still have proper access to justice under
these international regimes vis-à-vis other Member States or the EU, given that: first, they
cannot pursue litigation under the agreements’ dispute resolution system if the foreign body risks
interpreting the agreement, which also forms part of EU law; second, they cannot rely on these
agreements before the Court.This article argues that a rethinking of the direct effect doctrine of
international agreements is necessary. Member States should not be equated with individuals,
when invoking international agreements before the Court to challenge the validity of EU acts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Article 216 TFEU grants the EU the possibility to conclude international
agreements which are binding upon its institutions and the Member States. The
type of agreements to which the Union is a signatory can fall under exclusive EU
competence, but national and Union competence can also coexist in the context
of an international agreement, thus giving rise to the concept of ‘mixity’.1 It
might also happen that an agreement was signed only by the Member States, but
over time the Union took over the Member State obligations covered by the
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1 P. Koutrakos,EU Internatonal Relations Law 137 (Hart Publishing 2006) [hereinafter Koutrakos].
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd. ‘EU Member State Enforcement of “Mixed” Agreements and Access to Justice:
Rethinking Direct Effect’. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 40, no. 2 (2013): 163–190.
© 2013 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands
agreement and became bound by it.2 It is also possible that an agreement was
signed by all the Member States, and the Union is not bound by it.3
This article shall only focus on mixed agreements, to which both the EU and
the Member States are parties. In accordance with the principles applicable to
mixed agreements, the part of the agreement that is based on shared competence
between the EU and the Member States becomes an integral part of the EU legal
order. Consequently, the Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘the Court’) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over these provisions just like it would have for provisions
falling under exclusive EU competence. However, if part of the agreement falls
under exclusive Member State competence, the Court shall not have any
jurisdiction over it.4 Therefore, the part of the agreement that falls under exclusive
Member State competence shall be granted effect according to the laws of the
Member State. In such a case, ‘EU law does not require or forbid the legal order of
a Member State to accord to individuals the right to rely directly’ on the rule laid
down in the agreement.5
However, it is not only the Court that has jurisdiction over international
agreements. Most agreements set up their own dispute resolution mechanisms,
ranging from many highly developed and judicial dispute settlement mechanisms
like the WTO panels and Appellate Body, to Joint Committees found in most
cooperation or association agreements.
The first part of this article deals with Article 344 TFEU, according to which
Member States are barred from pursuing other means of dispute settlement when
the application or the interpretation of the Treaties is at issue.The second part of
the article offers a short introduction into the reasons for denying direct effect to
certain international agreements as well as the conditions under which a Member
State can rely on an agreement before the Court. The third part focuses on the
procedures in which a Member State can rely on an international agreement
before the Court. This is followed by the risks of not providing Member States
with proper access to justice when they need to rely on international agreements.
2 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschaap voor Groenten en
Fruit [1972] E.C.R. 01219 – The Community (Union) became bound by the GATT 1947, as during
the transitional period it took over the Member States’ competences in the areas covered by the
Common Commercial Policy.
3 For e.g.The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified
by the Protocol of 1978 (Marpol 73/78);The Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1947 (The
Chicago Convention). See also: The Union, the Member States and International Agreements (editorial
comments), 48 Com.Mkt. L. Rev. 1, 1-7 (2011).
4 N. Lavranos, Concurrence of Jurisdiction between the ECJ and other International Courts and Tribunals, 14
European Envtl. L. Rev. 213, 220 (2005) [hereinafter Lavranos,Concurrence of Jurisdiction].
5 C-392/98, Dior and Others [2000] E.C.R. I-11307, para. 48; C-431/05, Merck Genericos v. Merck [2007]
E.C.R. I-07001, para. 34; Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie v. Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia
[2011], 2 CMLR 43, para. 32.
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The last part of the article comprises the purpose of this academic endeavour.
Linking the previous findings, the question arises of how a Member State should
seek justice against the EU or another Member State, when it too is a signatory to
an international agreement. Article 344 TFEU gives exclusive jurisdiction to the
Court over the matter, but at the same time Member States might be denied the
possibility to rely on the agreement. Does then such a scenario hamper Member
States’ access to justice under the international agreement?
It shall be argued that when a Member State invokes an international
agreement in order to review the legality of EU measures, the question of direct
effect should not arise at all. If direct effect of the agreement was still a
precondition for the review of EU legislation, the broad interpretation of direct
effect should be followed. Furthermore, this article does not focus on the doctrine
of ‘consistent interpretation’ which is a secondary means of granting effects to
international agreements and has certain limits compared to direct effect.6
2 ARTICLE 344TFEU AND ACCESSTO JUSTICE
Article 344 TFEU (former Article 292 TEC) was one of those provisions, that up
to some years ago remained ‘all but unnoticed’ for fifty years.7 According to Article
344 TFEU, ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than
those provided for therein.’8 Prior to the Mox Plant judgment,9 the Court only
succinctly referred to former Article 292 TEC in Opinion 1/91. It held that this
provision confirms the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court when it comes to
disputes arising between Member States, concerning the interpretation or
application of the EC Treaty (now TFEU).10 The Court went on to refine the
interpretation of this article in Mox Plant.
In this case, the United Kingdom authorized the building of a nuclear waste
recycling plant (Mox plant) on the shores of the Irish Sea. Prior to the judgment
6 For the doctrine of ‘consistent interpretation’ of national law in light of EU law, see A. Arnull, The
European Union and its Court of Justice 229–225 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2011); for the doctrine of
‘consistent interpretation’ of EU law in light of international law, see P. Eeckhout, EU External
Relations Law 355–357 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2011).
7 N. Lavranos, Mox Plant Dispute – Court of Justice of the European Communities: Freedom of member states to
bring disputes before another court or tribunal, 2 European Const. L. Rev. 456, 456 (2006) [hereinafter
Lavranos,Mox Plant Dispute].
8 Highlights added by author.
9 C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] E.C.R. I-4635, paras. 40–44 [hereinafter Commission v. Ireland
(Mox Plant)].
10 Opinion 1/91 [1991] E.C.R. I-06079, para. 35.
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of the Court, the Irish authorities sought justice without success11 before an
arbitral tribunal set up under the OSPAR Convention.12 Ireland also instituted
proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in AnnexVII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It also requested the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to institute interim
measures. The ITLOS held that it had prima facie jurisdiction and dismissed the
United Kingdom’s objections against jurisdiction. Later on, the United Kingdom
raised the same objections once again before the Arbitral Tribunal, which notified
the European Commission and decided to suspend proceedings, arguing that there
was a possibility that the Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the matter.13
The Commission launched infringement proceedings against Ireland, and the
Court delivered a judgment which prohibited Ireland from pursuing other means
of dispute resolution, arguing that the issue involved the interpretation or
application of EU law.The judgment delivered by the Court, however, ‘has been
met with mixed feelings, as it raised many questions regarding concurrent
jurisdiction’ of different international dispute settlement bodies.14
Relying on previous case-law,15 the Court held that UNCLOS (signed under
shared competence) formed an integral part of the European legal order, and
mixed agreements have the same status in EU law as purely EU agreements.16
Given that UNCLOS was a mixed agreement, it had to be seen whether the
provisions of the Convention relied on by Ireland before the Arbitral Tribunal
came under Union competence.17 The Court first argued that the question of EU
competence is one which relates to the attribution and thus, the very existence of
competence and not to its exclusive or shared nature.18 Using its previous
conclusions in AETR,19 the Court held that when the Treaties grant such
competence, the existence of external EU competence does not depend on the
adoption of secondary EU legislation.20 Lastly, if a declaration of competence is
attached to the international agreement, then the rules set out in the declaration
11 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under 9 of the OSPAR Convention between Ireland and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, final award, Decision of 2 Jul. 2003,
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/59-151.pdf (accessed 11 Feb. 2013) [hereinafter
OSPAR, Ireland v. UK].
12 Ibid., para. 185.
13 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), paras. 40–44.
14 N. Schrijver, Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, 47 Com. Mkt. L. Rev.
863, 863 (2010) [hereinafter Schrijver].
15 Case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA [2006] E.C.R. I-0000, para. 36 and Case C-13/00, Commission v.
Ireland [2002] E.C.R. I-02943, para. 14.
16 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), paras. 82-84.
17 Ibid., para. 86.
18 Ibid., para. 93.
19 Case 22/70,Commission v. Council (AETR) [1971] E.C.R. 00263, para. 17.
20 Ibid., paras. 94–95.
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have to be followed.21 In the specific context of UNCLOS, the ‘Declaration of
Community competence’ made the transfer of shared competences subject to the
existence of Union rules.22 In the areas covered by this case, the EU had already
enacted secondary legislation, some of which were used by Ireland in its pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal. Given the existence of such directives, the Court
concluded that the parts of UNCLOS relied on by Ireland before the Arbitral
Tribunal fell under Union competence.Therefore, it had jurisdiction to deal with
disputes that concern the application and interpretation of those provisions.23
However, it had to be seen whether this jurisdiction is exclusive, as to
‘preclude’ any other forms of dispute settlement. Relying on previous opinions,24
the Court first argued that an international agreement cannot affect the allocation
of responsibilities defined in the Treaty (TFEU).Article 344 TFEU conferred to it
the exclusive jurisdiction to handle disputes between Member States with regard
to the interpretation or the application of the EC Treaty (TFEU).25 It then
referred to Article 282 UNCLOS, which gives precedence to a dispute settlement
procedure agreed through a ‘general, regional or bilateral agreement’ relating to a
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.26 The
Court argued that the UNCLOS provisions at issue came under Union
competence, and the dispute concerns the interpretation and application of the
EC Treaty (TFEU), within the terms of Article 344 TFEU.27 It then concluded
that Article 344TFEU was breached, as Ireland had submitted EU law instruments
for interpretation by a foreign dispute settlement body. Furthermore, as a
consequence of these actions, Ireland breached Article 10 TEC (now Article 4(3)
TEU), which ‘must be understood as a specific expression of Member States’ more
general duty of loyalty’.28
The Mox Plant judgment can, thus, be seen as a clarification of previous
case-law and opinions with regard to Union competence over international
agreements.The Court also concluded that in this specific case Article 344 TFEU
granted it exclusive jurisdiction, as to preclude any other forms of dispute
settlement. However, the judgment is important for another reason as well.
Submitting a dispute concerning another Member State to a foreign judicial body,
that risks applying or interpreting EU law, does not only constitute a breach of
21 Ibid., paras. 98–108.
22 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), paras. 106–107.
23 Ibid., paras. 110–121.
24 Opinion 1/91 [1991] E.C.R. I-6079, para. 35 and Opinion 1/00 [2002] E.C.R. I-3493, paras. 11–12.
25 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), paras. 123.
26 Ibid., para. 125.
27 Ibid., paras. 126–127.
28 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), para. 169.
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Article 344 TFEU, but is also a breach of the Member States’ general duty of
loyalty.
Some clarifications, however, are needed when examining the Court’s line of
arguments. It is problematic for the Court to rely on Article 282 UNCLOS when
it comes to the conclusion that the system of dispute resolution between Member
States, under the TFEU, takes precedence over the dispute resolution system
contained in UNCLOS.29 Article 344 TFEU is intended to apply to disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaties and does not act as a
general clause for the settlement of any international dispute.30 ITLOS specifically
stated, when asked to order provisional measures, that Article 282 of the
Convention31 only refers to those ‘general, regional or bilateral agreements, which
provide for the settlement of disputes concerning what the Convention refers to as
“the interpretation or application of this Convention”’.32 It furthermore held that
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the OSPAR Convention and the EU
Treaties ‘deal with disputes concerning the interpretation and application of those
agreements, and not with disputes arising under the Convention’.33 However,
states can provide that priority and exclusivity is to be given to the dispute
settlement mechanism of one treaty over the other, when both treaties cover
similar issues.34 Therefore, Article 344 TFEU could be viewed as an expression of
the contracting parties (the Member States) to favour the enforcement of the
foundingTreaties, over other international agreements.
In conclusion several issues need to be highlighted. First, the fundamental
condition to trigger the application of Article 344 TFEU is, whether a Member
State submitted a dispute which concerns the application or interpretation of the
Treaties to a different dispute settlement method. Second, an international
agreement to which the EU is a party forms an integral part of the EU legal order
and the Court will treat the part of the agreement that falls under EU competence
as EU law.Therefore, a breach of Article 344 TFEU will also arise when such an
international agreement is submitted to a foreign forum which might decide over
issues concerning the Union part of the agreement’s application or interpretation.
29 Ibid., para. 125.
30 Schrijver, 875.
31 This would be a case of ‘residual jurisdiction’, according to which a court’s jurisdiction operates when
no other international court or tribunal exercised its jurisdiction in the matter. See P.J. Kuijper,
Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts: The Case of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Free Trade
Agreements and the WTO, Issue Paper No. 10, ICTSD, Geneva, Sep. 2010, 32–33.As a consequence of
Art. 282 UNCLOS, ITLOS will exercise its jurisdiction, when no other agreements exist which
provide that another international court/tribunal should apply or interpret the UNCLOS provisions.
32 ITLOS, The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Case No. 10 Order of 3 Dec. 2011, para. 48
[hereinafter ITLOS,The Mox Plant Case].
33 Ibid., para. 49.
34 P. Eeckhout, The EU and its Member States in the WTO – Issues of Responsibility, in Regional Trade
Agreements and theWTO Legal System 467 (L. Bartels & F.Ortino eds., Oxford U. Press 2006).
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3 THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT EFFECT ON ACCESSTO JUSTICE
The goal of this article is to examine how the requirement of direct effect might
impede Member States’ access to justice in relation to international agreements.To
this end, this section shall first briefly deal with the most important agreements to
which the Court has denied direct effect and shall then be followed by the more
sensitive question of the requirement of direct effect of international agreements
and Member States.
3.1 THE LACK OF DIRECT EFFECT OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
This sub-section shall succinctly present how the GATT and theWTO Agreement
were denied direct effect, as well as the more recent denial of direct effect to the
UNCLOS and certain provisions of the Aarhus Convention.35
The denial of direct effect of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement
became one of those hotly debated topics that spurred an abundance of legal
literature, criticisms and commentaries.36 In International Fruit Company,37
individuals challenged the validity of measures adopted by the EU institutions in
light of the GATT through the preliminary ruling mechanism.The Court went on
to conclude that such a review was possible if: (a) the EU is bound by the
agreement in question and (b) the agreement confers rights on individuals which
they can invoke before the courts.38 Although the EU did not sign the GATT, the
Court held that it had assumed the functions inherent in the tariff and trade policy
through the gradual transfer of those powers from the Member States to the EU.39
The Court went on to analyse ‘the spirit, the general scheme and the terms’ of the
agreement and found that the system was based on reciprocal and mutually
advantageous agreements that offered too much flexibility in their provisions.
35 The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 1998) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
36 For further reading see also: Koutrakos, ch. 7; Eeckhout, at 343–365; G.A. Zonnekeyn, Direct Effect of
WTO Law (Cameron May 2008); B.E. Olsen, M. Steinicke & K.E. Sørensen, WTO Law From a
European Perspective ch. 5 (Wolters Kluwer 2012); M. Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in the European
Court Litigation, 40 Texas Intl. L. Rev. 443 (2005);A.Antoniadis, The European Union andWTO Law:A
Nexus of Reactive, Coactive, and Proactive Approaches, 6 World Trade Rev. 45 (2007); M. Bronckers, The
Relationship of the EC Courts with Other International Tribunals: Non-Committal, Respectful or Submissive?,
44 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 601 (2007); M. Bronckers, The Domestic Law Effect of the WTO in the EU – A
Dialogue with Jacques Bourgeois, in Trade and Competition Law in the EU and Beyond (I. Govaere, R.Quick
& M. Bronckers eds., Edgar Elgar Publg. 2011).
37 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produktschaap voor Groenten [1972] E.C.R.
01219 [hereinafter International Fruit Company].
38 International Fruit Company, paras. 7–8.
39 The ‘functional succession’ doctrine.
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Thus, the General Agreement was not capable of conferring rights to individuals
that could be invoked before the courts.40
Later on in Germany v. Council41 (in detail in section 3.2) the issue of GATT’s
effects arose in the course of Article 263 TFEU review proceedings. The Court
came to the conclusion that the same features of the General Agreement that
stopped individuals from relying on it, would also bar Member States to invoke it
when challenging secondary EU legislation.The Court also restated and clarified
its earlier findings in Fediol42 and Nakajima,43 holding that it can only review
Union acts in light of the GATT provisions, if the EU intended to implement a
particular obligation or the EU act expressly refers to a specific provision of the
General Agreement.44 These exceptions were later on referred to as the
‘implementation principle’. However, the Court in subsequent cases interpreted
the Nakajima exception restrictively so as to only apply in the specific situation of
WTO anti-dumping.45
As regards the WTO Agreement, to which both the Member States and the
European Union were now signatories, the Court decided not to depart from its
previous jurisprudence regarding GATT. Although the new WTO regime had a
much stronger institutional structure and one of the most well-developed dispute
settlement systems, which contains many compulsory elements, the Court in
Portugal v. Council46 decided to extend the previous GATT case-law to the newly
adoptedWTO Agreement.The Court did not expressly use the term ‘direct effect’
when it came to the conclusion that theWTO agreements due to their nature and
structure ‘are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is
to review the legality of measures adopted by the [Union] institutions’.47
However, when arguing for the need to introduce the criteria of reciprocity in
order to prevent the ‘disuniform application of the WTO rules’,48 the Court
alluded to the practices of other contracting parties where the WTO might or
might not enjoy ‘direct application’.49
40 International Fruit Company, paras. 14–27.
41 Case C-280/93,Germany v. Council [1994] E.C.R. I-04973 [hereinafter Germany v. Council].
42 Case 70/87, Fediol v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 01781.
43 Case C-69/89,Nakajima v. Council [1991] E.C.R. 01689 [hereinafter Nakajima v. Council].
44 Ibid., para. 111.
45 Eeckhout, at 361–363. See Case T-19/01, Chiquita v. Commission [2005] E.C.R. II-315, para. 120. In
two very recent cases, the General Court decided to extend the ‘implementation principle’ to the
Aarhus Convention as well. Because the Commission appealed, it shall be seen whether the Court will
follow the General Court’s judgment or overturn it. See Case T-396/09, Vereniging Milieudefensie v.
Commission [2012], not yet published and Case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur v. Commission [2012], not
yet published.
46 Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council [1999] E.C.R. I-08395 [hereinafter Portugal v. Council].
47 Ibid., para. 47.
48 Ibid., para. 45.
49 Ibid., para. 44.
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For a while, it seemed that the GATT/WTO Agreement were the ‘black
sheep’ of international agreements, being denied direct effect in Article 267 TFEU
proceedings or at least the possibility to rely on it in Article 263 TFEU
proceedings. However, the Court struck again in Intertanko50 by not granting
direct effect to UNCLOS. Several associations alleged that multiple provisions of
an EU directive ran against UNCLOS.51 The Court applied the ‘WTO method’
to the interpretation of the Convention52 and held that the validity of EU
secondary legislation can be reviewed in the light of an international agreement if
two conditions are met: (a) the EU is bound by the agreement, and (b) the nature
and the broad logic of the agreement does not preclude the review of validity as
well as the provisions of the agreement are unconditional and sufficiently
precise.53 The Court found that the EU was bound by UNCLOS under Article
216(2) TFEU (former 300(7) TEC) as it was a contracting party. In the Court’s
words, the provisions of the Convention ‘codify, clarify and develop’ the rules of
general international law relating to the peaceful cooperation of the international
community when exploring, using and exploiting marine areas and lays down
legal regimes governing these areas, but does not in principle grant independent
rights and freedoms to individuals.54 The irony of this decision is that the
individuals concerned did not invoke the Convention to claim rights for
themselves but to review the Union’s compliance with its international
obligations.55
The latest convention to join the group of international agreements signed by
the EU, without having direct effect, is the Aarhus Convention. In the recent
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie judgment,56 the Court held that Article 9(3) of the
Aarhus Convention did not have direct effect within EU law as it did not contain
any clear and precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position of
individuals.57
50 Case C-308/06, Intertanko v. Secretary of State [2008] E.C.R. I-04057 [hereinafter Intertanko].
51 The validity was also challenged under the Marpol 73/78 Covention.The Court found that the EU
was not bound by Marpol 73/78 as only the Member States were signatories to it, and no functional
succession took place.
52 M. Bronckers, From ‘Direct Effect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’ – Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case
Law on theWTO and Beyond, 11 J. Intl. Econ. L. 858, 894 (2008).
53 Intertanko, paras. 44-45.
54 Ibid., paras. 53-59.
55 S. Marsden, Invoking Direct Application and Effect of International Treaties by the European Court of Justice:
Implications for International Environmental Law in the European Union, 60 Intl. & Comp. L. Q. 737, 753
(2011) [hereinafter Marsden].
56 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie v. Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia [2011], 2 CMLR 43
[hereinafter Lesoochranárske zoskupenie].
57 Ibid., para. 45.
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3.2 MEMBER STATES AND DIRECT EFFECT
The question of effects of international agreements mostly arose in preliminary
ruling proceedings that concerned individuals. Therefore, some commentators
were of the opinion that the doctrine, according to which the review of legality of
secondary EU legislation was preconditioned by the direct effect of the
agreement, did not apply to direct actions of annulment brought under Article 263
TFEU.58 Such a situation soon arose in Germany v. Council. Germany challenged
the validity of several provisions of the ‘Banana Regulation’59 under Article 263
TFEU (former Article 173TEEC), claiming that they were contrary to the GATT.
Before going into the analysis of Germany v. Council, it is important to clarify
the issue of what exactly is meant by ‘direct effect’.The concept of direct effect of
EU law has undergone developments since Van Gend en Loos. Gradually, a second
concept emerged in the Court’s case-law which led academics to differentiate
between the broad and the narrow concepts of direct effect.60 Thus, according to
the former, the concept of direct effect is broader because it allows those
provisions to be relied upon, which do not as such create rights.61 Such provisions
can be invoked for other purposes, such as the review of national legislation.The
latter concept refers to the provisions creating rights which can be enforced in
national courts.62 Consequently, direct effect can either refer to the ‘invocability’ of
a provision before a national court or to its capacity to create enforceable rights.63
Regarding this case, Germany submitted that compliance with GATT rules
should be a precondition for the legality of Union acts, ‘regardless of any question
as to the direct effect of GATT’.64 The Court reiterated its findings in International
Fruit Company and held that although GATT binds the Union, the ‘scope’ of it in
the Union legal system has to be assessed by looking at the ‘spirit, general scheme
and the terms of GATT’.65 Based on this method of purposive interpretation,
the Court denied Germany the right to invoke GATT in order to challenge
the lawfulness of secondary EU legislation. It held that the same features of
the Agreement that precluded individuals from ‘invoking’ GATT to challenge the
58 Eeckhout, at 294.
59 Reg 404/93.
60 S. Prechal, Does Direct Effect Still Matter?, 37 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 1047, 1050 (2000) [hereinafter
Prechal].
61 Another development in the concept of direct effect of EU law allows not only individuals, but also
national administrations to rely on EU law before national courts. See Prechal, 1049 with reference to
Case C-431/92,Commission v. Germany (Grosskrotzenburg) [1995] E.C.R. I-02185.
62 Ibid., 1050–1052, with reference to P. Pescatore, The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of
Community Law, 8 European L.Rev. 155 (1983).
63 P. Craig & G. de Burca, EU law:Text, Cases and Materials 270 (Oxford U. Press 2008) [hereinafter Craig
and de Burca].
64 Germany v. Council, para. 103.
65 Ibid., para. 105.
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lawfulness of EU acts would apply in an action brought by a Member State, for the
same reasons.66 Thus, the great flexibility of GATT provisions, the possibility of
contracting parties to unilaterally suspend obligations and the possibility to
negotiate, are special features which are not unconditional and ‘an obligation to
recognize them as rules of international law which are directly applicable in the
domestic legal systems of the contracting parties cannot be based on the spirit,
general scheme or terms of GATT’.67
The arguments offered by the Court are not without criticism. The Court
does not mention the term ‘direct effect’ per se, but it does mention the term
‘directly applicable’, and it also refers to the possibility of an individual to ‘invoke’
the agreement at hand.Two observations have to be made.
First, the Court sometimes considers the formula ‘produces direct effects and
creates individuals rights’ to be synonymous with ‘directly applicable’.68 The
terminological confusion between direct effect and direct applicability can also be
found in the Court’s case-law regarding the effects of international agreements in
the EU legal order.69 As the difference between the two terms shall be explained
later on, now it suffices to say that the term ‘directly applicable’ used by the Court
in this judgment could refer to several different concepts.
Second, one must look at how reliance on the GATT was denied in
International Fruit Company and Germany v. Council. In the former, the Court came
to the conclusion that the special features of the General Agreement could not grant
enforceable rights to individuals, and therefore they could not challenge the validity of
secondary EU legislation. In other words, the special features of the agreement
denied it having ‘narrow direct effect’. In the latter case, the Court came to the
conclusion that the same special features of GATT precluded a Member State from
‘invoking’ the agreement in order to challenge the validity of secondary EU
legislation. In other words, the special features of GATT denied it having ‘broad
direct effect’.
66 Germany v. Council, para. 109.
67 Ibid., para. 110.
68 P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law:Text, Cases and Materials 105 (Oxford U. Press 2011). See Case 93/71,
Leonesio v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture [1972] E.C.R. 293, para. 22 – the Court refers to the direct effect
mentioned in former Art. 189 EEC (Art. 288 TFEU); in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, para. 13. –
when defining direct effect, the Court also refers to the lack of implementation into national law of the
Treaty provision, which is actually direct applicability.
69 The Court uses the term direct effect in the following cases: Portugal v. Council, para.34; Case
C-93/02, Biret [2003] E.C.R. I-10497; Cases C-120/06 and C-1201/06, FIAMM v. Council and
Commission [2008] E.C.R. I-06513; Case C-257/99, Barkoci and Malik [2001] E.C.R. I-06557, para.
30; Case C-265/03, Simutenkov [2005] E.C.R. I-02579; Case C-213/03, L’etang de Berre [2004]
E.C.R. I-07357.The Court uses the term directly applicable in the following cases: Case 12/86, Demirel
[1987] E.C.R. 03719, para. 14; Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk [2001] E.C.R. I-06369, para. 29;
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, para. 44.
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Based on this, it can be said that the same features of the General Agreement
that deny it narrow direct effect, also deny it broad direct effect. Eeckhout
concludes that, whether an international agreement can be relied on in order to
challenge the validity of secondary EU legislation depends on the direct effect of the
agreement, and it is irrelevant: (a) whether the agreement is relied on in a direct
action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU; (b) whether it is relied on before a
national court in order to challenge the validity of EU legislation; or (c) whether
that action was brought by an individual, Member State or EU institution.70 These
conclusions need to be accepted with reservations, keeping in mind the differences
between narrow and broad direct effect.
Koutrakos is of the opinion that this reasoning of the Court ‘mitigates the
implications of a two-tier test for the application of the direct effect’ doctrine, as
Member States and individuals are equally barred from relying on certain
agreements, under the same conditions.71 Eeckhout also views this development as
a positive one, as it ‘indeed should not matter’ under which procedure and by
whom is the legality of secondary EU legislation challenged.72
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the Court in Germany v. Council used
the same features of GATT that prohibited it to grant rights to individuals, in
order to prohibit a Member State of relying on it in Article 263 TFEU
proceedings. Besides the terminological confusion, it seems that in the case of
Member States, the Court favours the notion of ‘broad direct effect’. Thus, the
focus falls on whether an agreement can be invoked and not whether it confers
rights to individuals. Given these, it is yet a matter of assumption, whether the
Court would deny Member States the possibility to invoke the UNCLOS or
Aarhus Convention in order to challenge the validity of secondary legislation,
following the same line of argument that it used to deny individuals the possibility
to do so.
4 HOW CAN MEMBER STATES ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS?
Article 344 TFEU is worded without distinguishing as to the respondent party.
Thus, not only actions against other Member States, but also actions brought
against the Union73 before an international dispute settlement body are
prohibited.Therefore, under EU law, a Member State is barred from relying on an
international agreement before another international forum, if that international
70 Eeckhout, at 295.
71 Koutrakos, at 255.
72 Eeckhout, at 295–296.
73 This is a highly unlikely scenario, given the Member States’ duty of loyalty towards the Union.
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agreement is considered to be EU law, the application and interpretation of which
cannot be subjected to a foreign dispute settlement method.
The next sections shall deal with the situations in which Member States can
or should be able to invoke international agreements either as a defence
mechanism or as a basis of their claim.74 The review of legality of secondary EU
law is not the only basis of a dispute involving an international agreement.
4.1 A DIRECT ACTION DISPUTE: REVIEW OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION
Article 263 TFEU allows a Member State to bring proceedings before the Court
for the review of legality of secondary legislation and acts of the institutions,
among other grounds, for the infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law
relating to their application. In Germany v. Council, the Court made it clear that in
order for a Member State to challenge the validity of secondary EU legislation in
light of GATT, the same special features of GATT that barred an individual from
invoking it, would also apply to Member States.
However, the judgment in Netherlands v. Parliament and Council75 may add
some nuance to these previous findings. The Netherlands launched Article 263
TFEU proceedings, alleging that an EU Directive76 infringed several international
agreements.The Court held that the Union is not bound by the European Patent
Convention (ECP), as it is not a party to it. Furthermore, the two WTO
Agreements (TRIPS and TBT Agreement) were not of the kind that permitted
the review of legality of secondary EU legislation.77 The same conclusion,
however, was not reached with regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD). Looking at the features of the CBD, the Court first went on to hold that
unlike the WTO Agreement, the agreement at hand is not strictly based on
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.78 According to the Court:
(54) Even if, as the Council maintains, the CBD contains provisions which do not have
direct effect, in the sense that they do not create rights which individuals can rely on
directly before the courts, that fact does not preclude review by the courts of compliance with
the obligations incumbent on the [Union] as a party to that agreement […]
(55) Moreover, and in any event, this plea should be understood as being directed, not so
much at a direct breach by the [Union] of its international obligations, as at an obligation
74 Besides the three possibilities mentioned here, it seems that Art. 265 TFEU could also entitle a
Member State to launch an action against a Union body, by invoking the Union’s failure to
implement an international agreement, the failure to abide by it or give effect to the decisions of the
judicial bodies set up by the agreements.
75 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] E.C.R. I-07079 [hereinafter Netherlands v.
Parliament and Council].
76 Dir 98/44.
77 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, paras. 51–52.
78 Ibid., paras. 53.
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imposed on the Member States by the Directive to breach their own obligations under
international law, while the Directive itself claims not to affect those obligations.79
It seems that even though an agreement is incapable of conferring rights to
individuals, it could still act as a ground for the review of secondary legislation, in
order to check whether the Union complies with its international obligations.
One possible reading is that the Court ‘felt embarrassed’ by not allowing Member
States, also parties to mixed agreements, to pursue judicial review on grounds of
violation of certain agreements.80 Corroborating these findings with the
argumentation in Germany v. Council, it seems that when Member States challenge
the validity of secondary legislation in light of an agreement, the Court will favour
the ‘broad’ notion of direct effect.Therefore, when Member States seek to review
EU legislation to check compliance with the Union’s international obligations, it
should not matter whether direct effect is granted in the sense that the agreement
creates rights to individuals which they can invoke before the courts (narrow
direct effect).What should matter is whether the features of the agreement grant
the Member States the possibility to invoke the agreement (broad direct effect).
It is hard to draw general conclusions from a handful of cases. Netherlands v.
Parliament and Council is important though, because it seems to acknowledge that
States should be able to ask for the review of EU acts in light of their international
obligations, even if that agreement does not confer rights to individuals.
4.2 A MEMBER STATE VERSUS MEMBER STATE DISPUTE
Member States are international actors with treaty-concluding powers and are
frequently parties to international disputes, unlike for example the constituent
States of the USA.81 ‘Legal disputes between Member States are a rare occurrence’
whether before the Court or international tribunals that deal with inter-state
disputes.82 The choice of forum to settle the dispute between the two Member
States will largely depend on whether the issue falls under EU competence or
Member State competence. In the latter case, the Member State is free to refer the
dispute to an international dispute settlement body.
79 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, paras. 54–55; highlights added by author.
80 Eeckhout, at 298.
81 According to Article I sec. 10 Cl.1 of the US Constitution, ‘No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation[…]’. However, when it comes to the judicial enforcement of the law, both
state and federal courts have a role. See also P.J.White, Legal, Political and Ethical Hurdles to Applying
International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States, 71 Cincinnati L. Rev. 937,
938–940 (2002–2003).
82 P.J. Cardwell & D. French, Who Decides? The ECJ’s Judgment on Jurisdiction in the Mox Plant Dispute, 19
J. Envtl. L. 12, 122 (2007) [hereinafter Cardwell and French].
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Article 259 TFEU allows a Member State to bring a case before the Court
against another Member State, for an alleged infringement of its obligations under
the Treaties. This also holds true for the infringement of an international
agreement to which the EU is also a party, as the agreement forms an integral part
of EU law.83 The Commission will first have to be notified and shall deliver a
reasoned opinion.84 However, direct confrontations between Member States are
undesirable and might destabilize the Union. For this reason,Article 259 TFEU is
rarely used, and Member States prefer to delegate the law enforcement functions
to the Commission.85
Because of the rare use of Article 259 TFEU, it is not yet known whether
direct effect of the international agreement is a precondition in order for a
Member State to rely on it against the infringing Member State. Therefore, an
analysis of Article 258 TFEU should provide the basis for an analogy given that
both articles refer to infringement proceedings, however, brought by different
actors.
4.3 INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BY THE COMMISSION
Under Article 258 TFEU, the Commission can launch infringement proceedings
against a Member State that ‘has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties’.
Under Article 216(2) TFEU, agreements signed by the Union are binding on both
the institutions and the Member States; the Member States will not only have to
comply with the Treaties but also any international agreement to which the EU is
a party to.86
The Commission availed itself of this prerogative in Commission v. Ireland,87
where it launched proceedings against Ireland, for Ireland’s failure to adhere to the
Berne Convention.This obligation was laid down in one of the Protocols to the
EEA Agreement, to which Ireland was a party as well. The Court reiterated
previous case-law according to which mixed agreements have the same status as
purely EU agreements.88 Furthermore, Member States are under an obligation
within the EU system to ensure the respect of commitments arising from an
agreement concluded by the EU.89 The Berne Convention creates rights and
83 Case 181/73,Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] E.C.R. 00449, paras. 5–6 [hereinafter Haegeman v. Belgium].
84 L. Prete & B. Smulders, The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings, 47 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 9, 27
(2010).
85 C. Harlow & R.Rawlings,Accountability and Law Enforcement:The Centralized EU Infringement Procedure,
31 European L.Rev. 447, 452 (2006).
86 Eeckhout, at 301.
87 Case C-13/00,Commission v. Ireland [2002] E.C.R. I-02943 [hereinafter Commission v. Ireland].
88 Ibid., para. 14.
89 Ibid., para. 15.
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obligations in areas covered by EU law and thus, Member States have to fulfil the
requirement under the EEA Agreement’s Protocol to adhere to the Berne
Convention.90
The case is interesting because the agreement that contained the specific
obligation is the EEA Agreement. Both the Commission and the Court relied on
this agreement to prove Ireland’s failure to fulfil its obligations under it. However,
nowhere in the judgment does the Court mention the necessity of the EEA
Agreement to have direct effect in order to be relied on in the proceedings.Thus,
the question arises whether direct effect of the international agreement is only a
precondition when the validity of EU legislation is challenged or whether this
holds true in other proceedings as well. According to Eeckhout, it appears that
‘there is no requirement of direct effect or creation of rights, or any other form of
requirement, for an agreement to qualify as the basis for an enforcement
action’.91Would this also hold true for a Member State v. Member State infringement
case?
The author’s contention is that the same requirements should be applied in
both scenarios. It should not matter whether enforcement is sought by the
Commission or by the Member State; in both types of infringement proceedings,
direct effect should not be a precondition.
5 POTENTIAL RISKS IN LIMITING ACCESSTO JUSTICE
Under EU law, Member States cannot pursue any forms of dispute settlement
before a foreign body, if that judicial body risks applying and interpreting an
agreement which is also a part of EU law and under EU competency. It follows
that the only available judicial venue is the Court, which will decide whether they
are capable of invoking the agreement or not.
If Member States are denied access to justice by the Court, they might be
prone to seek remedies before the dispute settlement bodies of international
agreements or ad hoc bodies. The Article 344 TFEU prohibition is only binding
on Member States of the EU, but it does not have any effect on international
courts, committees or arbitral tribunals. While customary international law is
binding on all states, treaties are only binding on the contracting parties.92
Furthermore, there is no hierarchy between the various international dispute
settlement bodies.93
90 Ibid., paras. 19–20.
91 Eeckhout, 302.
92 N. Lavranos, The Mox Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes:Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter?, 19 Leiden
J. Intl. L. 223, 233 (2006) [hereinafter Lavranos,Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter?].
93 Lavranos,Concurrence of Jurisdiction, at 216.
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ITLOS considered ‘that both in terms of the content of the various treaties
involved, as well as the dispute settlement procedures put in place to determine
disputes thereof, each treaty (UNCLOS, OSPAR Convention, EUTreaties) was an
individual, and identifiable, legal manifestation worthy of equal respect’.94 Some
argue that other international dispute settlement bodies should accept the
precedence of EU primary law over international law in the EU legal order
because the EU legal order is a sui generis one, and from an international law
perspective it stands on an equal footing with international law.95
Whether an international judicial forum will defer a case to the Court of
Justice will be up to that dispute settlement body to decide. Several scenarios can
arise. First, the international forum might suspend proceedings until the question
of competence is settled between the EU and the Member States.96 Second, the
international judicial body might simply disregard any questions of competence
and internal procedures.97 Third, the tribunal might consider that although several
treaties can contain similar or identical rights and obligations, each one of these
rights and obligations has a separate existence under the specific treaties.98 Lastly,
the arbitral tribunal might assert that it will not interpret EU law, but it will none
the less do so.99
In the Iron Rhine100 case, the Netherlands and Belgium agreed to submit their
differences to arbitration under the auspices of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, even though there was a risk that the interpretation of EU law might
be involved. The arbitral tribunal took account of Article 344 TFEU and
acknowledged what the parties agreed in the arbitration agreement. The
agreement between the two states specified that the arbitral tribunal would refer a
preliminary question to the Court of Justice, if during the proceedings it would
have to engage in the interpretation of EU law.101 Therefore, in this case the
Commission did not launch infringement proceedings against the two Member
States (Netherlands and Belgium) for violating Article 344 TFEU, even if the
arbitral tribunal might have actually interpreted EU law. In this type of situations,
the launching of infringement proceedings will be at the discretion of the
94 Cardwell & French, 123. See also ITLOS,The Mox Plant Case, paras. 47–52.
95 Lavranos,Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter? 233.
96 Ibid., 225–226.The Arbitral Tribunal, set up under UNCLOS in the dispute between Ireland and the
UK, suspended proceedings until issues of jurisdiction were settled.
97 OSPAR, Ireland v. UK, paras. 143–144.
98 ITLOS,The Mox Plant Case, para. 50.
99 The Kingdom of Belgium and The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine
(IJzeren Rijn) Railway,Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 24 May 2005 [hereinafter Iron Rhine award]. See
also Lavranos,Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter? 228.
100 Iron Rhine award.
101 Ibid., para. 103.
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Commission. And if such cases do occur, then it will be a question of comity,102
whether the Court will accept the foreign tribunal’s decision or award.
In conclusion, there is a possibility for Member States to ‘flee’ from the Court
and seek access to justice at other judicial fora. However, such a situation would
raise other problems, such as the enforcement of these awards in the EU legal
order and the possibility of the Commission to launch infringement proceedings.
In order to avoid such scenarios, the best solution would be for Member States to
refrain from pursuing international dispute settlement when the interpretation of
EU law might occur or if they wish to pursue other forms of dispute settlement,
conclude an arbitral agreement like the Netherlands and Belgium did in the Iron
Rhine case.
6 RETHINKING DIRECT EFFECT IN ORDERTO ALLOW ACCESSTO
JUSTICETO MEMBER STATES
The main role of the Court is to ensure that the law is observed in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties. 103 Whether the Court offers proper
access to justice to Member States, when it takes over the role of the judiciary
from foreign dispute settlement bodies is questionable.
One recent example is eloquent.The Court denied granting direct effect to a
specific provision of the Aarhus Convention dealing with individuals’ access to
justice in environmental matters.104 It could be assumed that if direct effect is not
granted to such a provision, then the EU could at least provide similar protection.
The Compliance Committee, however, found that access to justice for individuals
under Article 263 TFEU does not live up to the EU’s obligations under the
Convention.105 The Committee held, that parties are not forbidden under Article
9(3) Aarhus Convention ‘from applying general criteria of a legal interest or of
demonstrating a “direct or individual concern” provided the application of these
criteria does not lead to effectively barring all or almost all members of the public
from challenging acts and omissions related to domestic environmental laws’.106
102 Using the words of the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, considerations of ‘mutual respect and comity’
should prevail between judicial institutions when both of them might be called upon to determine
rights and obligations between states. See Ireland v. United Kingdom (Mox Plant), PCA,Arbitral Tribunal
Order No. 3, 24 Jun. 2003, para. 28, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148 (accessed 11
Feb. 2013).
103 D. Chalmers,European Union Public Law 143 (Cambridge U. Press 2010) [hereinafter Chalmers].
104 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie.
105 Compliance Committee under the Aarhus Convention (CC), Findings of April 2011
I ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I), European Community: Client Earth – Access to the European Court of Justice,
paras. 69–95, http://www.clientearth.org/reports/aarhus-convention-compliance-committee-c32-
findings.pdf (accessed 8 Feb. 2013).
106 Ibid., para. 80.
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After reviewing the case-law of the Court pertaining to the Plaumann test, the
Compliance Committee came to the conclusion that this test is too strict to meet
the criteria set down by the Convention.107 If a parallel could be drawn with the
conclusions of the European Court of Human rights in Bosphorus, the Court of
Luxembourg should handle matters which fall under an international agreement,
only if it can provide ‘equivalent’ protection to that offered by the specific
agreement.108
The scope of this section is to provide remedies for situations when Member
States do not have proper access to justice before the Court, when invoking an
international agreement.To this end, they should be capable of invoking any type
of international agreements, to which they are signatories as well. Three possible
solutions shall be explained in detail in the following. First, Member States should
be able to invoke an international agreement before the Court, regardless of
whether it grants rights to individuals or not. Second, even if ‘direct effect’ remains
a precondition, the broader approach of this concept should be used. Third, if a
precondition was still preferred, than this should be ‘direct applicability’.
6.1 DIRECT EFFECT SHOULD NOT BE A PRECONDITION FOR MEMBER STATES TO
INVOKE AN AGREEMENT
Just as the concept of supremacy of EU law, the concept of direct effect has been
developed by the Court. A distinction is made between ‘internal direct effect’ and
‘external direct effect’.The former denotes the relationship between EU law and
national law while the second one applies to the relationship between
international law and EU law.109 Strangely enough, the Court seems to apply the
concept of direct effect of international law, much like the direct effect of EU law,
without fully taking into account the different actors that can invoke the
international agreement.
6.1.[a] Direct Effect is a Means of Private Enforcement
Direct effect has been called a powerful tool, ‘allowing individuals to enforce rights
which are solely granted by EU law’.110 Article 258 TFEU provided for a means
of public enforcement of EU law, but it was silent on the issue of private enforcement.111
107 Ibid., para. 87.
108 Case of Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm v. Ireland (Application No. 45036/98), Judgment of the ECtHR
of 30 Jun. 2005, para. 108.
109 Eeckhout, at 330.
110 Marsden, 744.
111 Craig & de Burca, at 269.
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The reasons of the Court to develop the notion of direct effect of EU law are
to be found in the aim of legitimating private enforcement of EU law, ‘by holding
that Treaty articles, subject to certain conditions, have direct effect, such that
individuals could rely on them before their national courts and challenge
inconsistent national action’.112 Over the years, the jurisprudence developed and
became more complex and was expanded to include besides Treaty articles,
regulations, decisions and to a certain extent, directives.113 The initial Van Gend en
Loos criteria were loosened and according to some commentators, ‘the invocability
of Treaty provisions has now been reduced to a simple question of justiciability’.114
Others consider that direct effect causes more harm than good, and the concept
became wide and diluted.115
Given that within EU law, direct effect has been designed in order to allow
individuals to enforce a right conferred by EU law in their national courts, caution
should be taken when this concept is applied to the world of effects of
international law within the Union legal order. Direct effect remains a tool for the
private enforcement of EU law, and the concept has been broadened and diluted
when it comes to the effects of EU law in the national legal orders.Therefore, the
usage of a stricter approach for Member States when invoking international
agreements against EU law seems unfounded and not in line with the
development of the direct effect of EU law.
6.1[b] Member States Invoke International Agreements for Different Reasons
International agreements create three different types of legal relationships:
interstate relationships, relationships among private parties and relationships
between private parties and a state.116 Therefore, the obligations and rights of
Members States under an international agreement are different than the rights or
obligations which individuals can derive from them.When individuals invoke an
international agreement, the question that the Court should raise is whether the
agreement confers rights that can be invoked before the court, in other words,
whether the agreement in question affects the legal status of the individual.117 The
reason for a Member State to invoke an agreement is not whether ‘the legal status
112 Ibid., at 269.
113 Ibid., at 269–302. See also A.Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice ch. 7 (Oxford U. Press
2006) [hereinafter Arnull].
114 Chalmers, at 273 with reference to P. Pescatore, The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of
Community Law, 8 European L.Rev. 155, 176–177 (1983).
115 Prechal, 1068.
116 S.D. Murphy, Does International Law Obligate States to Open their National Courts to Persons for the
Invocation of Treaty NormsThat Protect or Benefit Persons?, in D. Sloss, The Role of Domestic Courts inTreaty
Enforcement ch. 2 (Cambridge U. Press 2009).
117 Case C-366/10,The AirTransport Association of America [2011], Opinion AG Kokott, para. 58.
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of the individual’ is affected, but whether its own international obligations under
the agreement and its EU obligations under Article 216(2) of the TFEU are
affected by applying EU legislation which runs counter to them.
From the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is not apparent
whether contracting parties to an agreement can always derive rights or be liable
to obligations under an agreement. States frequently enter into soft law
agreements, most of which do not include any dispute settlement or monitoring
mechanism.118 However, according to the International Law Commission’s
preparatory works, the phrase ‘governed by international law’ also includes the
element of ‘intention to create legal obligations’.119 When the contracting parties
to an international agreement pursue litigation under the agreement’s dispute
settlement body, the simple fact of being a party to the agreement suffices to
defend their rights under the agreement. Direct effect of the agreement or
provisions of the agreement is not a precondition. The same holds true for the
foundingTreaties of the EU, which can be invoked by the Member States, without
the need for the TFEU or the TEU to have direct effect.This does not hold true
for individuals. Unlike the Member States, which as signatories of theTreaties have
rights and obligations under them, for individuals to rely on the Treaties it has to
be seen whether the provisions would create rights for them.120
Therefore, a Member State wants to prevail itself of the right to challenge EU
measures which it deems contrary to its obligations under the international
agreement.As a party to the agreement and as a member of the Union, it is bound
to perform the international agreement co-concluded by the Union in good
faith.121 However, an individual seeks to enforce a specific right which is granted
to him/her by the agreement, by challenging legislation that runs contrary to the
agreement.
The Court fails most of the time122 to notice the different reasons for which
an agreement is invoked by a Member State or an individual. The Court should
acknowledge this difference and allow Member States to invoke the agreement
freely, in order to prevent a breach of their own international obligations.
118 A.T. Guzman,The Design of International Agreements, 16 European J. Intl. L. 579, 581 (2005).
119 Intl. L. Commn.,Drafts on the Law of Treaties with commentaries 189, para. 6 (1966).
120 Case 26/62,Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie [1963] E.C.R. 1.
121 Article 26 VCLT.
122 The Court partially acknowledges that Member States might infringe their international obligations,
due to conflicting EU law. See also Case C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] E.C.R.
I-3655, paras. 48–49 and Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, para. 55.
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6.1[c] Direct Effect of International Agreements is Not a Precondition in Infringement Proceedings
As previously mentioned, when the Commission brings infringement proceedings
against a Member State under Article 258 TFEU, for the failure to fulfil an
obligation under an international agreement, it seems that direct effect of the
international agreement is not a precondition.This conclusion is correct, as Article
258 TFEU is a public enforcement mechanism, where the conferral of individual
rights is not an issue. Given that in essence, Article 259 TFEU provides for an
infringement procedure launched by the Member State and not the Commission,
it would seem logical that as a means of public enforcement, the conferral of
individual rights should not arise.
Furthermore, as previously concluded, the rights and obligations of a Member
State under an international agreement are different than those of individuals.The
breach of any of these obligations can be a reason to launch infringement
proceedings. Thus, it does not matter whether the infringement is based on the
Member State’s obligations to enact legislation, or the Member States failure to
grant certain rights to its citizens. Infringement proceedings will still be launched
without the need of the international agreement to have direct effect. It follows
that, by introducing the precondition of direct effect in order to challenge EU
legislation in light of an international agreement, the Court is protecting EU law
from international law, but it does not apply the same standards for the review of
national law in light of the international agreement.
6.1[d] An International Agreement Already Has Different Effects
As mentioned, some authors argue that the Court’s ruling in Germany v. Council is
welcomed because it does not differentiate between who invokes an agreement
and in what type of proceedings, thus equally barring Member States and
individuals from relying on an agreement. Therefore, it creates a sense of unitary
application of the agreement.123 When it came to the GATT/WTO agreements,
the same features of GATT that prohibited the granting of right for individuals,
also prevented a Member State from doing so. The question is, would the same
reasons for which the UNCLOS was denied the capability of conferring rights to
individuals, bar a Member State from invoking it?
Arguing that this should be done so for the sake of the unitary application of
an agreement can be challenged for several reasons. First, a mixed agreement has
two separate existences. The part of the agreement that falls under exclusive
Member State competence shall be granted effect according to the laws of the
123 Supra nn. 71–72.
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Member States. In such a case, ‘EU law does not require or forbid the legal order
of a Member State to accord to individuals the right to rely directly’ on the rule
laid down in the agreement.124 Second, it seems that the same international
agreement does not need to have direct effect if relied on in infringement
proceedings.
Therefore, to bar a Member State from having access to justice under and
international agreement, based on the argument that international agreements
should have a unitary application, is incorrect. International agreements already
have different effects, depending on whether the EU or Member States have
competence over a specific part of the agreement.
6.1[e] Direct Effect of theTreaties is Not Necessary in Article 263TFEU Proceedings
An international agreement forms part of EU law from the moment of its entry
into force.125 International law has primacy over secondary EU law, and it is
situated between the foundingTreaties and secondary legislation.126
Member States are ‘privileged applicants’ under Article 263(1) TFEU and
have a ‘general power to seek judicial review of acts of the EU institutions’.127
They have ‘general and unrestrained policing power’ against the EU institutions,
which is justified due to the important public interests the Member States are
meant to protect.128 It appears that they can launch actions for annulment, even
when the act is addressed to others.129 According to the last paragraph of Article
263 TFEU, the only condition that has to be met by Member States is the
two-month time limit.
Therefore, when a Member State brings a direct action under 263 TFEU,
which challenges the validity of secondary EU legislation for breaching one of the
founding Treaties, there is no requirement whatsoever that the founding Treaties
confer rights to individuals. Given that international agreements are situated above
secondary EU legislation, thus they become ‘the higher’ norm in the light of
which review of legality is sought.
As previously discussed, the Court showed some willingness in Netherlands v.
Parliament and Council to grant a Member State the possibility to invoke an
international agreement, even if that agreement did not confer rights to
individuals. It is interesting to note how the Court acknowledged that Member
124 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, para. 32; C-392/98, Dior and Others [2000] E.C.R. I-11307, para. 48;
C-431/05,Merck Genericos v. Merck [2007] E.C.R. I-07001, para. 34.
125 Haegeman v. Belgium, paras. 5–6.
126 Marsden, 742.
127 Chalmers, at 413.
128 Ibid.
129 Craig & de Burca, at 508.
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States might be put into the difficult position of breaching their own international
obligations, because of EU law which claims that does not affect such
obligations.130 These findings come as partial relief to what certain Member States
witnessed during the Banana saga, when Germany was eventually obliged to apply
EU legislation, which it was not allowed to challenge and which the WTO
condemned as well.131
6.2 IF DIRECT EFFECT REMAINS A PRECONDITION, THE BROAD APPROACH SHOULD
BE PREFERRED
As previously mentioned, the concept of direct effect of EU law has undergone
developments since Van Gend en Loos. Besides the narrow approach of granting
rights to individuals, a provision could also have broad direct effect. In this case, the
determining factor is whether the provision can be invoked and not whether it
grants rights to individuals.
In Germany v. Council, the Court evaded the term ‘direct effect’ but came to
the conclusion that the same features of the GATT that barred it from conferring
rights to individuals would also bar Member States from being able to invoke it.
Later on in Netherlands v. Parliament, the Court was more specific in stating that
even if a provision of an international agreement does not have direct effect, in the
sense of granting rights to individuals, it could still be invoked by a Member State
in Article 263 TFUE review proceedings. Therefore, there is a possibility of an
international agreement of having ‘broad direct effect’ for Member States, even if it
did not have ‘narrow direct effect’ for individuals.
As previously mentioned, the reasons for a Member State to rely on an
international agreement are different than those of individuals.Whether a specific
substantive right is conferred or not on the individual, should not be a
precondition. If direct effect is to be used for Member States as well, than the
broad approach should be followed. Thus the question should be whether a
Member State that signed the agreement has the right to ‘invoke’ the agreement.
Furthermore, if certain international rules are ‘less perfect’, they could still be used
as a ground of reviewing EU legislation.
6.3 IF A PRECONDITION WAS NEEDED, IT SHOULD BE ‘DIRECT APPLICABILITY’
Different terms denote the effects of international agreements in the domestic
legal order. International rules can have ‘direct effect’; they can be ‘directly
130 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, paras. 54–55.
131 Eeckhout, at 296.
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applicable’ or ‘self-executing’. The Court of Justice apparently considers the
formula ‘produces direct effects and creates individuals rights’ to be synonymous
with ‘directly applicable’, although it has never used the term ‘self-executing’,
favoured by the US legal system.132 As previously mentioned, the Court also uses
these terms interchangeably, when looking at the effects of international
agreements. In certain cases, an agreement is deemed to have ‘direct effect’,133
while in similar cases the Court uses the expression ‘directly applicable’.134
Without going into too much detail, it suffices to mention that the question
of effects of international norms in domestic law first arose in the United States.
According to the United States Supreme Court in Foster v. Nielson,135 a treaty is
self-executing when it can be directly applied ‘by the courts or executive agencies’
without further implementing measures.136 It will depend on the agreement,
whether for its correct application, implementation measures are needed or not.137
The creation of individual rights and duties, however, is not essential in the US
notion of ‘self-executing’.138 If a parallel may be allowed, international agreements
can either be applied without the need of any further implementing measures, just
as regulations, or subsequent implementing measures might be needed, the method
of which is left to the contracting party, just as in the case of directives.139
However, the concept of direct effect that is so often used and understood by
European legal thinkers found its way into EU law through a different route.
European scholars mainly relied on the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in Jurisdiction of the Courts in Danzig.140 As a result of this
opinion, self-executing treaties were regarded in Europe as those which confer
rights to individuals, enforceable in national courts.141
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Whether a treaty is directly applicable (self-executing) or whether it grants
individual rights or duties are two different questions which should not be
confused. For example, treaties which merely set forth powers or duties of judicial
or administrative authorities of states can also be directly applied in domestic
law.142 Creating rights and duties to individuals is only a single facet of directly
applicable treaties.143 In the United States, self-executing/directly applicable
treaties have the status of judicially enforceable federal law the moment they are
ratified.144 It follows that as long as a treaty does not require further implementing
measures it should be enforceable.
Given these consideration, there are two distinct fundamental problems that
have to be distinguished. First, how is treaty law incorporated in the domestic legal
order and becomes the law of the land? Second, under which conditions are these
rules that became the law of the land, susceptible of being invoked before the
national courts by individuals?145
It is the author’s contention that in order to have a better understanding of
the relationship between international agreements and EU law,‘direct applicability’
should refer to agreements which do not need further implementing measures.
However, ‘direct effect’ should be used when an international agreement grants
rights to individuals which they can enforce before the Court of Justice or the
national courts (narrow direct effect).
Therefore, if any precondition was necessary for a Member State to rely on an
international agreement before the Court, it should be the direct applicability of
the agreement; whether it can be applied without any further implementing
measures. The conferral of rights on individuals should be exclusively a
precondition for private parties. Even the precondition of ‘direct applicability’
seems unnecessary, as Member States are signatories to mixed agreements as
sovereign entities. Such a construction would mean that for part of the agreement
that falls under EU competence, the Member States would be equated with simple
domestic authorities. Such a conclusion seems unfounded.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Because Member States, unlike constituent states of federal entities, still retain a
broad range of sovereignty in external matters, it is hard to delineate where EU
competency ends and Member State competency begins.
142 Ibid., 648.
143 Ibid.
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The role of Article 344 TFEU is unquestionable, as a means of providing
uniform application of EU law and preventing the risk of fragmentation of EU
law due to enforceable foreign decisions delivered for disputes between certain
Member States. It is questionable whether international agreements should fall in
the ambit of this article, but the case-law as it stands now clearly affirms this.
However, given that most international agreements are signed by Member States,
the latter should be afforded adequate access to justice by the Court.Therefore, the
direct effect of international agreements should not be a precondition when
relying on them in order to challenge the validity of EU legislation. If
preconditions are still to be used, the author has argued that the concept of ‘direct
applicability’ is much more advisable, or keeping in line with the development of
the direct effect of EU law, a broader approach to direct effect is welcomed.
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